Extended Producer Responsibility Laws Reduce E-Waste

Why are Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policies an effective method for reducing hazardous electronic (e-) waste? Challenging the Chip: Labor Rights and Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry¹ describes EPR as policy instruments “that hold manufacturers accountable for the full costs of their products at every stage in their life cycle” (p.247). Equipment is taken back at the end of its useful life by the producer, or hired contractor, for recycling. This way, products containing environmental or health-damaging components will not contribute to pollution in landfills, incinerators, or in the informal recycling system (exposure for scrap pickers). Producers are forced to internalize the costs of disposal and, therefore, are more likely to implement product design changes to minimize non-recyclable and hazardous materials.

The European Union (EU) passed two directives in 2003 dealing with electronic wastes. The Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) made manufacturers responsible for managing e-waste disposal. The Restrictions on the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) phased-out the use of hazardous materials in such equipment (p.265). Why does EPR work? First, these restrictions created a market opportunity for companies to sell their products in the EU and beyond. It would have been prohibitively expensive for manufacturers to have separate non-hazardous and hazardous product lines. Plus firms did not want to face bad publicity or liability for hazardous versions of their products (p.248). So they anticipated legislative changes and redesigned their entire product lines. Second, individual manufacturer responsibility rules forced companies to fully internalize the cost of e-waste disposal. This drove the innovations in design that reduced disposal costs and fostered ease of recycling (p.275).

While the EU was successful in instituting the EPR directives above, similar policies face implementation obstacles in the United States. Powerful industry associations, like the Electronics Industry Alliance (EIA), have argued for voluntary recycling programs and defended the use of certain materials in electronic products (p.266). The American Electronics Association (AEA) resisted sharing up-front costs of recycling. They also claimed material bans would undermine the functionality, reliability, and safety of their products (p.248). Furthermore, they sought help from the federal government’s U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) who put counter pressure on the EU, saying the regulations violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and were “unnecessary barriers to trade” (p.248-9). In a later affront to EPR, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) prohibited the federal government from adopting preferences for environmentally sustainable products (p.257).

EPR’s success in the U.S. depends on organizations’ ability to attract more industry support, like that won from Hewlett-Packard and Dell in the 2001 Computer TakeBack Campaign (p.250). In addition, strong state (and eventually national) laws that reflect the true spirit of EPR must be enacted to force manufacturers to internalize the costs of toxic materials in their bottom lines.

~Mark Bremer, Green Explored Contributor

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[1] Smith, T., Sonnenfeld, D., Pellow, D. Hightower, J (2006). Challenging the Chip: Labor Rights and Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry. Temple University Press. Philadelphia, Pa.

Doomed to Perpetuate Environmental Injustice?

As Mark Twain once said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” Are we doomed to perpetuate environmental injustices of the past? In Chronicles from the Environmental Justice Frontline¹, authors Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss documented the struggles of two low-income, ethnic minority Louisiana communities plagued by toxic contamination. The residents of Grand Bois couldn’t stop oilfield wastes from being dumped in open pits outside their town. Gordon Plaza residents were unable to gain relocation compensation or a proper cleanup of toxic landfill contaminants. Local and state governments were unwilling or unable to change laws or regulations to protect communities affected by existing contamination. These communities also didn’t have enough outside help from national organizations or media attention to pressure governments to change. Class-action law suits didn’t get them what they wanted either. They are still trapped.

The fact that residents of Grand Bois and Gordon Plaza were allowed to be exposed to toxic contaminants is a testament to corporate greed and ineffectual government oversight. The Environmental Protection Agency passed responsibility for regulating oilfield waste down to the states. Louisiana determined these toxic wastes to be non-hazardous (p.146). Oil firms found rural Louisiana was a cheap place to dump their drilling fluids without having to pay for disposal of hazardous waste. In the former Agricultural Street landfill case, local government officials had ties with those who benefitted financially from the public housing construction deal. Developers of the Gordon Plaza neighborhood failed to adequately cover the site with sand prior to construction, which cut costs and increased short-term profits (p.171). Government officials never ordered testing of the soil for contaminants prior to construction. Corporations and governments colluded in allowing these contaminations to occur.

Class-action legal approaches didn’t work in contamination cases partly because communities let the lawyers handle the cases alone. “Lawyers need protests and activism to keep the lawsuits moving” (p.207). Support from national organizations allowed other communities fighting environmental injustices cited in Chronicles to put pressure on government agencies to make regulatory changes. Sustained media coverage helped expose cases of injustice and pressure politicians for solutions. Of course, class-action legal settlement outcomes were sealed by request of the defendants, frustrating further organizing and future cases (p.163, 207).

Legal backlashes occurred due to the contamination fights in Louisiana, making it even more difficult for victims of existing contamination to gain relief. Business and government leaders conspired to limit low-income client access to Tulane University environmental law clinic (p.201). Governor Foster worked with the Louisiana legislature to pass an oil industry-sponsored bill that stopped the ability of plaintiffs to sue for medical monitoring expenses (p.162). Then Louisiana Senate Bill 709 passed, preventing researchers from withholding data from public health officials (p.153). This backlash was a reaction to Louisiana State University researcher Dr. Patricia Williams' decision not to share medical information collected during her independent study of heavy metal poisoning in the residents of Grand Bois.

Communities that gained outside help from national organizations and substantial national press coverage were successful in stopping proposed siting of polluting facilities. However, where contamination had already occurred, residents were unsuccessful in changing existing regulations to get relief and encountered serious legal setbacks as a result (p.210). It seems once the pollution occurs, the economic and political interests of the business and government elite is too strong to overcome. For the residents of Grand Bois and Gordon Plaza, environmental injustice still lingers.

~Mark Bremer, Green Explored Contributor

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[1] Roberts, J. Timmons, & Melissa Toffolon-Weiss. 2001. Chronicles from the Environmental Justice Frontline. New York: Cambridge University Press.